Institutional and informal lobbying practices: the problem of separation and interpretation
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Institutional and informal lobbying practices: the problem of separation and interpretation
Annotation
PII
S013216250017165-4-
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Valentina Levicheva 
Occupation: Prof., Head of Department of Applied Sociology
Affiliation: Russian State University for the Humanities
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Edition
Pages
50-60
Abstract

The article analyzes possibilities and limitations of institutional (including legislative) regulation of various consolidated representation and lobbying practices in interaction with government structures. Almost any legal institutional lobbying transaction will have its own inconspicuous twin reducing transaction costs in the public communications markets. Informal lobbying practices are used by all interest-based conglomerations, no matter how well established. In reality, laws can regulate only a small part of the behavioral diversity in the lobbying market, regardless of the state of a particular national legislation. The author identifies five reasons why formal and informal lobbying are complementary, and not interchangeable types of activities. The article describes the subjects of informal lobbying (including social networks).

Keywords
lobbying, institutionality, informal social interactions, informal practices, interest groups, regulation, institutional communications
Received
14.10.2021
Date of publication
19.10.2021
Number of purchasers
6
Views
135
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0.0 (0 votes)
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S013216250017165-4-1 Дата внесения правок в статью - 14.10.2021
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References

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